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NOTES 
The RICO Nexus Requirement: A "Flexible" Linkage 
In 1970, Congress, responding to what was perceived as an alarm-
ing increase in the activities of La Cosa Nostra, 1 enacted the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Reorganization Act (RIC0)2 as part of the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. 3 Created during a period 
marked by national and legislative paranoia over organized crime,4 
RICO was broadly drafted in order to help fill "the gaps" in the en-
forcement net through which the mob bosses were slipping.5 For five 
years after its passage ·ruco was largely ignored by prosecutors and 
1. See McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil 
Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 55-60 (1970). McClellan describes La Cosa Nostra as a 
criminal organization of 26 families that 
is directly descended from and is patterned upon the centuries-old Sicilian terrorists society, 
the Mafia. This organization, also known as Cosa Nostra, operates vast illegal enterprises 
that produce an annual income of many billions of dollars. This combine has so much 
power and influence that it may be described as a private government of organized crime. 
Id. at 59 (quoting the Final Report of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, infra note 
5). McClellan cites syndicated gambling, the importation and distribution of narcotics, and loan-
sharking as the chief activities of this organization. 
The threat of organized crime is very real. In 1967, the President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement estimated that the economic cost of organized crime is twice that of all other crime 
combined. PRESIDENT'S CoMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 31-35 (1967). This same commission 
estimated that organized crime annually earned an amount approximately equal to the aggre-
gated incomes of America's ten largest companies. Note, United States v. Sutton: Reining In on 
a Runaway RICO, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 131, 131 (1980). 
2. 18 u.s.c. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). 
3. Pub. L. No. 91452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). 
4. Congress was motivated by extensive evidence leading to the conclusion that organized 
crime was a "cancer in our cities," which would require strong measures to combat and 
eradicate. The hearings that preceded the Act, including Joseph Valachi's startling disclo-
sures of the organization and scope of the Mafia, led to a nationwide fear that our society's 
basic institutions were being eroded by this evil force. The popular reaction was not unlike 
the "red scares" that swept the nation in the 1920s and again in the 1950s. 
Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO. 65 IOWA L. REv. 837, 837 
(1980) (footnotes omitted). See generally Albanese, What Lockheed and La Gosa Nostra Have in 
Common: The Effect of Ideology on Criminal Justice Policy, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 211 (1982) 
(containing a general discussion of how the Valachi and Lockheed hearings led to the passage of 
new legislation). 
5. "The loopholes through which the leaders of organized crime now escape the processes of 
our law must be closed. Justice and public safety demand no less, and it is to this end that S.30 
was carefully drafted .... " McClellan, supra note 1, at 60 (footnote omitted). Congressional 
studies indicated that the members of La Cosa Nostra obtained dismissal or acquittal on charges 
leveled against them more than twice as often, on a percentage basis, as ordinary criminals. 115 
CONG. REc. Sl4430 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1969). The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation 
found that 
The crime leaders are experienced, resourceful, and shrewd in evading and dissipating 
the effects of established procedures in law enforcement. Their operating methods, carefully 
and cleverly evolved during several decades of this century, generally are highly effective 
571 
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the fervor about organized crime subsided; but the past few years have 
witnessed a dramatic increase in the use of Civil and Criminal RIC06 
as well as in the controversy surrounding the statute. 
The potential scope of RICO's broad substantive provisions7 com-
bined with its potent civil8 and criminal9 penalties has led to a vast 
body of critical legal scholarship and an equally large mass of con-
fused and often conflicting judicial opinions. 1° Critics argue that as 
currently applied, "the statute is too broad and constitutes a snare for 
persons and activities within, as well as outside of, the statute's in-
tended coverage."11 Indeed, a large number of courts have asked pros-
foils against diligent police efforts to obtain firm evidence that would lead to prosecution and 
conviction. 
The crime chieftains, for example, have developed the process of "insulation" to a re-
markable degree. The efficient police forces in a particular area may well be aware that a 
crime leader has ordered a murder, or is an important trafficker in narcotics, or controls an 
illegal gambling network, or extorts usurious gains from "shy locking" ventures. Convicting 
him of his crimes, however, is usually extremely difficult and sometimes is impossible, sim· 
ply because the top-ranking criminal has taken the utmost care to insulate himself from any 
apparent physical connection with the crime or with his hireling who commits it. 
PERMANENT SUBCOMMl'ITEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERN· 
MENT OPERATIONS, ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS, S. REP. No. 72, 
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE]. 
6. See Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 293 (1983). 
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) provides: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or 
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt 
in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, 
United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the 
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation 
of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 
commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and 
without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assist· 
ing another to do so, shall not be unlawful under.this subsection if the securities of the issuer 
held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in 
any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase 
do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, 
and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the 
issuer. 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or 
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any 
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, 
interstate or foreign commerce. 
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or 
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of 
subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section. 
8. 18 u.s.c. § 1964 (1982). 
9. 18 u.s.c. § 1963 (1982). 
10. See Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 
165 (1980); Tarlow, supra note 6. These two articles discuss RICO in its entirety and canvass the 
wide range of judicial opinions and critical writings. 
11. Note, RICO: Are the Courts Construing the Legislative History Rather than the Statute 
Itself?, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 777, 777 (1980) (emphasis added). 
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ecutors to exercise discretion in bringing RICO suits.12 
This Note argues that the RICO "nexus" requirement can be inter-
preted to limit effectively this overbroad use of RICO without emascu-
lating the statute. The "nexus requirement" is generally described as 
defining the word "through"13 in section 1962(c), the provision of 
RICO that makes it illegal to "conduct or participate, directly or indi-
rectly, in the conduct of [an] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity."14 This language establishes the necessity of 
proving a relationship between the enterprise and the racketeering. 15 
Once evidence of the alleged enterprise16 and the predicate racketeer-
12. See United States v. Ivie, 700 F.2d 51, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that warnings against 
prosecutorial abuse are not being observed in the Southern District of New York); United States 
v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1329 n.10 (9th Cir.) ("Like the Second Circuit we are not un-
mindful that 'the potentially broad reach of RICO poses a danger of abuse where the prosecutor 
attempts to apply the statute to situations for which it was not primarily intended.' We, too, 
'caution against undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking RICO.' ") (citations omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980)), cerL 
denied, 454 U.S. 1655 (1981); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1364 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(Among federal prosecutors, RICO has grown in "popularity beyond the intentions of Congress 
by bringing within the sphere of RICO minor offenses and by intruding on state power."), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). These requests for prosecutorial restraint canbe viewed as judicial 
admissions of an inability to provide a coherent and equitable interf>retation of RICO which is 
sufficiently limiting. They also can be seen as an admission that the judicial trend toward a broad 
interpretation of RICO has become too entrenched to reverse. 
There was evidence of this type of judicial impotency in Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 
1353-56 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 509 (1983), where the co.urt apologetically reached the 
conclusion that RICO had "federalized" the common law of "garden variety business fraud.'' 
The Court dismissed the defendant's claim that RICO was not intended to federalize all forms of 
business fraud but frequently used phrases such as "we are . . . without authority to restrict the 
application of the statute.'' 711 F.2d at 1253. 
In addition, the American Bar Association Section on Criminal Justice has promulgated a 
revised RICO which seeks to limit the undesirable and unintended tendency of the statute to 
preempt the common law conspiracy doctrine. Report to the House of Delegates, 1982 A.B.A. 
SEC. CRIM. Jusr. REP. 20 (1982). See generally Tarlow, supra note 6, at 295. 
13. See, e.g., Tarlow, supra note 10, at 228. Courts have looked for a relationship between 
racketeering and the enterprise although they have rarely labeled it as the "nexus requirement." 
Often emphasis has been placed on what it means to "conduct or participate" in the affairs of the 
enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1375 (4th Cir. 1979) (discussed at 
notes 49-55 infra and accompanying text), cert denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980). 
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). For the full text of this provision, see note 7 supra. 
15. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d 
Cir. 1975), cert denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). 
16. Most of the debate about the scope of RICO has centered around the definition of"enter-
prise" and this has been the most frequently litigated issue in § 1962(c) cases. The focal point of 
any analysis of an "enterprise" problem is the broad and ambiguous definition of enterprise in 
§ 1961(4): "[E]nterprise includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other 
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.'' 
Tarlow, supra note 6, at 324 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982)). 
The enterprise issue has been fully dealt with elsewhere. See generally Blakey & Gettings, 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Cnininal and Civil 
Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1025 n.91 (1980) (surveying the enterprise conflict); Tarlow, 
supra note 10, at 199-208; Tarlow, supra note 6, at 324-46; Eighth Circuit Survey - Criminal Law: 
RICO: The Illegitimate Stepchild of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1101 
(1981); Note, Elliot v. United States: Conspiracy Law and the Judicial Pursuit of Organized 
Crime Through RICO, 65 VA. L. REv. 109 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Conspiracy Law]; 
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ing acts has been submitted, the final element of proof must be that the 
racketeering and the enterprise are sufficiently related to justify a find-
Note, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations: Distinguishing the ''Enterprise" Issues, 59 
WASH. U. L. Q. 1343 (1982); Comment, Reading the ''Enterprise" Element Back into RICO: 
Sections 1962 and 1964(c), 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 100 (1981). While a full discourse on the enter-
prise issue would not be helpful, the debate does have implications for the nexus requirement. 
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), settled a circuit 
split by deciding that the term "enterprise" as defined in § 1961(4) encompasses illegitimate as 
well as legitimate enterprises. The Court left open the issue of whether this illegitimate enter-
prise must have an existence independent of the pattern of racketeering activity. If it must, a 
prosecutor cannot define the RICO enterprise as a group organized to commit the racketeering 
acts. The circuit courts have not clearly resolved this issue, but the decision by the Eighth Circuit 
in United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 
(1981), holding that the enterprise must have some economic existence apart from the racketeer-
ing has gained support. 
We hold that Congress intended that the phrase "a group of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity," as used in its definition of the term "enterprise" in section 
1961(4), to encompass only an association having an ascertainable structure which exists for 
the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal that has an exist· 
ence that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts constituting the 
"pattern of racketeering activity." 
See also Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), on rehearing en bane, affd. in part, revd. 
in part, 710 F.2d 1361, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982). The most important source of support has come 
from the advisory and nonbinding guidelines for prosecutors issued by the Justice Department 
which adopted the Anderson approach to the enterprise issue. See Justice Department to Shift 
Emphasis from White Collar Area, Giuliani Says, 30 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2238, 2239 (Dec. 23, 
1981). For a criticism of these guidelines as being "somewhat opaque," see Blakey & Gettings, 
RICO's Problem in the Courts: A Classic Case of Misreading, Natl. L. J., Mar. 9, 1981, at 28 n.3, 
col. 2. 
The Anderson approach is correct in that two unacceptable results follow from defining an 
enterprise as a group of people joined together solely to commit racketeering acts. First, a broad 
reading, such as the one adopted in United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 953 (1978), eliminates the enterprise requirement because establishing the pattern of 
racketeering establishes the enterprise. If the definition of enterprise requires a purpose to engage 
in racketeering, this in tum eliminates the nexus requirement. 
With subsections (b) and (c) [of section 1962], consideration must also be given to the re· 
quirement that the defendant operate "through" a pattern of racketeering activity. This 
element practically vanishes along with the enterprise element whenever the enterprise is 
defined as the association to commit the racketeering activity, but it can pose substantive 
limitations on prosecutorial zeal in the setting of infiltration of legitimate business. 
Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1366 n.13. This would leave only one element, the pattern of racketeering 
activity, to establish any RICO violation, a result contrary to congressional intent. 
We must presume, however, that had Congress desired to use RICO to prohibit all racke-
teering activity in connection with or through the instrumentality of a legitimate enterprise, 
it would have done so expressly. In this connection, it is pertinent that RICO's legislative 
history reveals a congressional intention to eradicate the infiltration of organized crime and 
racketeering into legitimate organizations, and not, in particular, to reach all racketeering 
activity which has any connection with a legitimate enterprise. 
United States v. Gibson, 486 F. Supp. 1230, 1244 (S.D. Ohio 1980), ajfd., 675 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 
1982); see also United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeland, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). See generally Comment, Reading the Enterprise 
Element Back into RICO: Sections 1962 and 1964(c), 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 100 (1981). 
Secondly, a broad enterprise interpretation amounts to according "the word 'enterprise' • • • 
parity with the term 'conspiracy.'" Altese, 542 F.2d at 108 (Van Graafeland, J., dissenting). If 
the racketeering activity can be used to define the enterprise then the prosecution can escape the 
rigors of common law conspiracy doctrine by invoking RICO. For articles reflecting the concern 
that RICO can be used to federalize the common Jaw of conspiracy, see Brickey, Conspiracy, 
Group Danger and the Corporate Defendant, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 431 (1983); Holderman, Recon· 
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ing of a RICO violation. Thus, the "nexus" requirement presents the 
question of whether RICO should apply in any particular case in 
which the central elements of the offense can be shown. Unfortu-
nately, section 1962(c) defines neither the nature of this relationship 
nor the degree of involvement necessary for it to exist. 
This Note advocates an approach to the "nexus" requirement 
which focuses on the extent to which the defendant utilized the "orga-
nizational structure" of the enterprise. 17 Rather than attempting to 
provide a rigid definition of utilization of organizational structure, it 
urges the factfinder to examine a series of factors which are indicative 
of enterprise exploitation. Part I of this Note analyzes the various ju-
dicial approaches to the nexus issue and argues that they are inade-
quate largely because of a reliance on rigid definitions. Part II provides 
an alternative approach by examining the language of section 1962(c), 
the legislative history of RICO and the ordinary conception of organi-
zational crime to establish that the concern of RICO, and particularly 
the nexus requirement, is with racketeer utilization -of organization or 
enterprise structure. The same material is used to elucidate a nonex-
haustive list of indicia of utilization of the enterprise. 
I. THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES 
A. The General Approach 
Generally, the courts have required the existence of a "sufficient" 
or "substantial" nexus or relationship in order to find a RICO viola-
tion.18 Unfortunately, the majority of courts using this approach do 
ciling RICO's Conspiracy and "Group" Enterprise Concepts with Traditional Conspiracy Doctrine, 
52 U. CIN. L. REv. 385 (1983); Note, Conspiracy Law, supra. , 
The nexus requirement is directly affected by the interpretation of the enterprise issue. When 
the enterprise is required to be independent of the racketeering activity, as is the case whenever a 
legitimate enterprise is alleged or in any· case arising in a jurisdiction that follows United States v. 
Anderson, the necessary degree of the relationship between these two elements becomes critical. 
"If the racketeering acts need not be related to each other and there is no requirement of a 
substantial nexus to the enterprise's affairs, the scope of RICO counts would be virtually unlim-
ited." Tarlow, supra note 6, at 371-72. Given an independent enterprise, the nexus requirement 
serves as an important limitation on the scope of § 1962(c). 
17. The scope of this Note is limited to "criminal" RICO and cases dealing with prosecutions 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). Since the substantive provision, § 1962, is the same for civil and 
criminal RICO this analysis, in theory, should have the same application in the civil area. How-
ever, there may be statutory and judicially created differences. See Haroco, Inc. v. American 
Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985). 
18. See generally United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1981), modified on rehearing. 669 F.2d 185, cerL denied, 454 
U.S. 857 (1982); United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 829 
(1982); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Campanale, 518 
F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976). In each of these cases the courts 
were content to assert that there was a sufficient nexus without introducing a standard to guide 
their decision. 
United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), ajfd., 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976), departs from the general trend of requiring a substantial 
relationship. Stofsky dealt specifically with the constitutionality of § 1962(c). The defendant 
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not define what a "substantial" nexus is, 19 and "substantial" and "suf-
ficient" are not words which are intrinsically helpful. The result of 
this failure is an "I know it when I see it" approach20 to RICO which 
presents the threat of uneven justice.21 
The spectre of inconsistent application that arises because of 
vagueness and ambiguity cannot be tolerated in a statute as potent as 
RIC0.22 First, the stakes involved are high; a person charged under 
criminal RICO faces the potential of a twenty-year sentence, forfeiture 
of assets in the alleged enterprise, 23 and collateral estoppel if a civil 
RICO suit is brought.24 A guilty verdict in a civil suit can result in 
treble damages25 and a variety of remedial26 injunctions. Second, 
vague language in court-created "tests" or definitions prevents the de-
fendant from adequately preparing a defense27 and creates the possibil-
argued that RICO was unconstitutionally vague since it failed to specify the relationship required 
between the predicate acts and the enterprise. The court agreed that a relationship was required, 
see text at note 15 supra, but found that § 1962(c) was not vague; it was just broad. 
It is true that the statute does not define this connection by distinguishing between predi· 
cate acts which play a major or a minor role, or any role at all, in what might be seen as the 
usual operations of the enterprise; nor does it require that such acts be in furtherance of the 
enterprise, as defendants suggest it must. 
In this Court's view, the statute fails to state these requirements because Congress did 
not intend to require them in these terms. The perversion of legitimate business may take 
many forms. It plainly says that it places criminal responsibility on both those who conduct 
and those who participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the enter-
prise, without regard to what the enterprise was or was not about at the time in question. 
409 F. Supp. at 613. Thus, Stofsky implies that no particular relationship is required. See Tar-
low, supra note 6, at 371. The Stofsky approach has only rarely been followed. See, e.g., United 
States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975) and United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd., 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978). 
19. See note 18 supra. The approaches of those courts which have attempted to provide a 
standard are discussed in notes 30-61 infra and accompanying text. 
20. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). A similar ap-
proach has been used to determine a racketeering enterprise injury under 18 U.S.C. § 1964. See 
Willamette Sav. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 (D. Ore. 1984). See 
generally Haroco, Inc. v. American Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. 
granted, 105 S. Ct. 902 (1985). 
21. The threat of uneven justice arises when a statute is vague because it is difficult to know 
what acts are in fact prohibited. Thus, the courts have broad discretion as to when they will 
apply the statute to particular conduct. Indeed, this ambiguity in RICO has precipitated charges 
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because "fundamental principles of due process • • • 
mandate that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct is 
prohibited." Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979). See also Tarlow, supra note 10, at 
191 n.138; Tarlow, supra note 6, at 309 n.67. 
22. Many of the same equitable considerations that Jed to the long-standing rule in favor of a 
narrow construction of criminal statutes should require the elimination of vagueness in RICO's 
application. See United States v. Branblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955) ("That criminal statutes are 
to be construed strictly is a proposition which calls for the citation of no authority."). For a 
discussion of the genesis of the strict construction rule, see Note, RICO and the Liberal Construc· 
tion Clause, 66 CoRNELL L. REv. 167 (1980). 
23. 18 u.s.c. § 1963 (1982). 
24. 18 u.s.c. § 1964(d) (1982). 
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). 
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982). 
27. One of the problems of vagueness is that the defendant may be "subjected to •.• com· 
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ity that a person may unwittingly violate the statute.28 Third, 
ambiguity may either exaggerate or diminish the deterrent effect of a 
criminal statute since it is not clear exactly what type of conduct soci-
ety is condemning.29 Thus, the substantial relationship approach is 
wholly inadequate to implement the RICO prohibitions in a meaning-
ful and effective manner. 
B. Attempts at Further Definition 
Perhaps in response to the inadequacies of the "substantial rela-
tionship" standard described above, the courts have adopted five dif-
ferent identifiable approaches to the nexus requirement in an effort at 
further definition. Each formulation offers a black-letter rule defining 
the nexus requirement, but for various reasons, each is inadequate. 
1. The ''Solely by Virtue of Position" Test 
Of those tests defining a "substantial nexus," the Scotto-Provenzano 
rule is the most commonly cited. In United States v. Scotto30 the court 
defines the nexus in two alternative ways: 
We think that one conducts the activities of an enterprise through a pat-
tern of racketeering when (1) one is enabled to commit the predicate of-
fenses solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in 
or control over the affairs of the enterprise, or (2) the predicate offenses 
are related to the activities of that enterprise. Simply committing predi-
cate acts which are unrelated to the enterprise or one's position within it 
would be insufficient.31 
The second test simply restates that the statute requires a relationship 
without defining the nature of the required nexus. However, there is 
some value in the first test because it focuses specifically on the nature 
of the relationship required. Notwithstanding, the first test is inade-
pulsion under a scheme of law whose imprecision in the framing of legal issues is such as to give 
the triers of fact a power to invade imperceptibly (and thus unreviewably) a realm of constitu-
tionally protected personal liberties .... " Note, The Void.for-Vagueness Doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 104 (1960). 
28. See text at note 11, supra. 
29. Ambiguity can chill legitimate conduct and result in overdeterrence because "the individ-
ual [is left] to guess at his peril whether he can or cannot be constitutionally punished for viola-
tion of the statute," and people therefore will be overly cautious. Note, supra note 27, at 76. 
Alternatively, if the statute is extremely ambiguous, there may be a weakening of the intended 
deterrent effect because an individual does not even contemplate that her conduct comes within 
the statute. 
30. 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981); see also United States v. 
Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982). 
31. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 
194 (3d Cir.) (union officials' RICO convictions for soliciting bribes upheld exclusively on au-
thority of Scotto), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982); United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (relying on Scotto), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983); United States v. Dozier, 672 
F.2d 531, 544 n.9 (5th Cir.) (nexus complete when power of the office enables one to obtain, or at 
least attempt to obtain, funds illegally), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982). 
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quate because it would punish acts that are clearly outside of RICO's 
intended purview. 
There are a variety of ways in which one's position within an enter-
prise can contribute to the commission of criminal acts. Consider three 
examples: First, a low-level corporate executive embezzles $100 from 
his firm on two separate occasions. Second, an employee of an enter-
prise sells narcotics to fellow employees whom he would not have met 
but for his position with the enterprise. Finally, a union official uses 
his power to obtain kickbacks from contractors in exchange for al-
lowing construction to take place with nonunion labor. Under the 
Scotto-Provenzano rule, all three of these acts may result in a finding of 
a RICO violation because the perpetrator's position enables him to 
commit the act. 
However, these acts do not all deserve the same treatment under 
RICO. While the union example is a clear RICO violation,32 the first 
two examples should not be within the purview of section 1962(c). The 
drug dealer, although affiliated with the enterprise, made no use of the 
enterprise. 33 Thus, the situation really does not involve the main im-
petus for and thrust of RIC0.34 The small-time embezzler, while ob-
viously using the enterprise to commit the acts, poses such a small 
threat that the use of RICO would amount to unintended overkill.35 
Literally read, the test requires that the offense was possible 
32. See United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.) (finding a violation on analogous 
facts), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982). 
33. The example of the drug dealer can be analogized to the facts of United States v. Dennis, 
458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978), ajfd., 625 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1980), where a RICO count was 
dropped against a General Motors employee who had collected an unlawful debt from another 
employee on General Motors property. The court held that there was no nexus between the 
activities and conduct of the enterprise. 458 F. Supp. at 199. It arguably is possible to bring this 
case under RICO on a "solely because of one's position" rationale. 
34. See notes 67·81 infra and accompanying text. 
35. Congress was well aware that the statute could encompass much more than organized 
crime and could affect individuals, but felt that because of the complexity of the problem, a broad 
and sweeping statute was needed. See McClellan, supra note 1. The Justice Department was 
aware of RICO's breadth and assured Congress that they would concentrate on serious cases. 
Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S.C §§ 1961-68: Broadest of 
the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 16 (1978). For the view that 
the Justice Department has ignored its reassurances, see United States v. Ivie, 700 F.2d 51 (2d 
Cir. 1983); Nagel & Flager, RICO, Past and Future: Some Observations and Conclusions, 52 U. 
CIN. L. R.Ev. 456, 457-58 (1983). 
The small-time embezzler should be distinguished from the large-scale embezzler for RICO 
purposes. Congress was concerned with the criminal element bleeding firms of assets, and saw 
this as one of La Cosa Nostra's most important tactics. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 141-42 
(claiming there are approximately 200 syndicate-inspired bankruptcy schemes annually). The 
executive who steals from "petty cash" does not pose the same threat to the enterprise and the 
economy as the large embezzler. Furthermore, RICO is a "remedial" statute as opposed to a 
"criminal" statute, i.e., it provides only new remedies, and does not create new substantive 
crimest See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 16, at 1021 n.71. Therefore, it makes sense to limit 
the remedies to.those crimes which were substantial enough to induce Congress to pass the Act. 
For a further development of the possible relevance of size of the crime, see notes 100-03 infra 
and accompanying text. 
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''solely" because of the defendant's connection to the enterprise. This 
would limit the application of RICO by excluding any case in which 
factors other than "position," "involvement" or "control" contributed 
to the defendant's commission of the racketeering activity. Because 
neither the Scotto court nor the courts which have followed its ap-
proach have elaborated upon the rule, it is not clear if they intended to 
so limit section 1962(c). Given the problems of proof that would arise 
if courts were required to determine that the only enabling factor be-
hind the racketeering was the defendant's position in the enterprise, 36 
it is doubtful that "solely" was intended to add anything to the test. 
The Scotto-Provenzano rule illustrates the difficulty that courts have 
had in attempting to create a concise and lucid definition of the "nexus 
requirement"; the concept has proven too elusive to be captured in a 
small number of words. 
2. The ''Effect" Test 
In United States v. Cauble, 37 the Fifth Circuit added to the Scotto-
Provenzano rule a requirement that "the predicate acts had some effect 
on the legal enterprise."38 This approach is another rigid definitional 
formulation which presents two distinct problems: a failure to define 
adequately its terms and a lack of attention to nonenterprise effects. 
The court does not adequately define the term "effect," stating that 
The effect may bedirect, such as the deposit of money in the enterprise's 
bank account, or indirect, such as the retention of the enterprise's ex-
isting clients. The government need not prove that the racketeering ac-
36. If the "solely by virtue of his position" formulation were read literally, then a defendant 
would have an incentive to claim that she was enabled to commit the acts for a number of 
reasons outside of the enterprise. Read literally the test would require a search for causation 
which would increase the burden of RICO litigation. 
37. 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 996 (1984). · 
38. The test as fully articulated requires that 
(1) the defendant has in fact committed the racketeering acts as alleged; (2) the defendant's 
position in the enterprise facilitated his commission of the racketeering acts, and (3) the 
predicate acts had some effect on the legal enterprise. 
706 F.2d at 1333 (emphasis added). The first element of the rule adds nothing to the nexus 
controversy since there is no issue if the defendant did not commit the acts. The second element 
incorporates the first test of the Scotto-Provenzano rule and thus suffers from the same flaws that 
plague that approach. See notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text The third element modifies 
the Scotto-Provenzano rule itself, asserting that there should be an enterprise-racketeering nexus 
in addition to the enterprise-defendant nexus. 
This division of nexus into two distinct elements is neither helpful nor correct. The language 
of§ 1962(c) does require a relationship between the enterprise and the defendant and the racke-
teering, but it does not follow that these should be analyzed as two distinct relationships as 
opposed to one nexus. The same facts that are used to establish that the defendant conducted or 
participated in the affairs of the enterprise should be used to prove this was done through a 
pattern of racketeering activity. Essentially the court in Cauble is arguing that Scotto defined the 
term "conduct or participate" but failed to define the term "through,'' which the Fifth Circuit 
felt required an effect test Dividing § 1962 into a series of elements just adds to the confusion. 
Only one issue needs to be addressed: did this defendant participate in the affairs of the alleged 
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity? "' • 
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tivity "benefitted" or "advanced the affairs of" the enterprise. . . . The 
prosecution need prove only that the racketeering acts affected the enter-
prise in some fashion. 39 
This standard provides no means of distinguishing among the variety 
of effects that racketeering may have on an enterprise. If any actual or 
theoretical effect on an enterprise will satisfy the court, the require-
ment of effect adds nothing to the Scotto-Provenzano rule. For exam-
ple, in the case of an employee selling narcotics to other employees, 
the reputational damage caused by possible negative publicity could 
qualify as an effect on the enterprise, as could a potential decline in 
worker productivity due to drug use. Thus, the courts failure to define 
the term "effect" renders it of little or no use. 
In addition to failing to define "effect," the Fifth Circuit improp-
erly ignored the important effects of criminal activity outside the or-
ganization itself. In passing RICO, Congress sought to combat the 
infiltration of businesses by organized crime not only because of the 
effects infiltration has on the enterprises themselves but also because of 
the injuries to specific victims and the economic cost to the general 
public.40 RICO's civil remedies demonstrate its concern for victims as 
well as its concern with the enterprise.41 The Fifth Circuit's emphasis 
on how the enterprise was affected runs the risk of ignoring the equally 
important issue of how the racketeer utilized the enterprise to injure 
others, regardless of the consequences to the enterprise.42 Neither the 
enterprise nor its owners may be benefited or harmed if the enterprise 
is used as a front for racketeering. However, in such a case the enter-
39. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1333 n.24 (citations omitted). 
40. Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) provides in part: 
(3) [T]his [organized crime's] money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and cor-
rupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic 
processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the 
· Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere 
with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the do-
mestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens. 
41. The remedies section of RICO provides, among other things, a cause of action for "[a]ny 
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962." 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1964(c) (1982). · 
42. A related, albeit short-lived, approach was put forth in United States v. Webster, 639 
F.2d 174, 185-86 (4th Cir. 1981), modified on rehearing, 669 F.2d 185, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 
(1982), which suggested that a nexus is established only when the enterprise is benefited, ad-
vanced, or promoted. The Fourth Circuit reversed its holding on rehearing, and rightfully so. 
Like Cauble, Webster's focus on the effects for the enterprise is misplaced. The benefit require-
ment is an unwarranted narrowing of RICO because much racketeering activity, such as a union 
official taking bribes, is detrimental to the enterprise and Congress was aware of this. See Mc-
Clellan, supra note 1, at 141 (including in the evils of organized crime's infiltration of legitimate 
enterprises the bleeding of a firm's assets and the selling of labor peace to employers). The 
Webster approach has been rejected uniformly by all other courts. See, e.g., United States v. 
Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1333 n.24 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 996 (1984); United 
States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 990-91 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); 
United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778, 785 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1982); United 
States"v.tWelch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). 
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prise plays a vital role in enhancing the racketeer's ability to injure her 
victims.43 Thus, the "effect" test is both too broad due to its ambigu-
ity and too narrow in that it fails to encompass nonenterprise effects, a 
significant concern of Congress in passing RICO. 
3. The ''Dictionary" Test 
A third attempt at definition of the substantial relationship ap-
proach is found in United States v. Nerone.44 In Nerone, the Seventh 
Circuit defined the "nexus" by turning to Black's Law Dictionary for 
the definition of the word "through." The court asserted that the 
word's most logical meaning was that supplied by the dictionary, 
which defined it as "by means of, in consequence of, by reason of."45 
However, given the importance of the "nexus" to the determination of 
the general scope of RICO, the extensive legislative history of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act, and the confusion that has arisen in its 
application, resorting to the dictionary is too simplistic to be appropri-
ate. 46 The court is simply restating that section 1962(c) required a 
nexus without defining the scope of the relationship. 
In addition to its oversimplification, this approach was used by the 
Nerone court to create an unwarranted distinction between conducting 
the affairs of an enterprise by means of racketeering and conducting 
the racketeering by means of an enterprise.47 The flaw with this dis-
tinction is that in a given fact situation, it is possible to describe the 
43. United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1980), modified on rehearing, 669 F.2d 
185 (1982), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1982), discussed in note 42 supra, provides an example of 
the type of case where the focus on the "effect" on the enterprise is misplaced. In Webster a 
nightclub was used as a front for a narcotics racket. On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit reversed 
its benefit test in favor of a test examining how the enterprise facilitated the drug ring. This was 
the crux of the case; the role of the enterprise was more important than the effect on the enter-
prise. One could imagine a fact situation similar to Webster in which there could be no benefit or 
harm traceable to the enterprise. Given the role the nightclub in Webster played in the commis-
sion of the crimes, it seems unconscionable to claim there was no nexus because there was no 
"effect." 
44. 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978). 
45. 563 F.2d at 851 (quoting BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1652 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)). 
46. Relying on the dictionary definition implies that § 1962(c) can be dealt with by giving the 
words their natural meaning. There is ample support for claiming that the parts of§ 1962(c) 
that constitute the nexus requirement are too vague to justify a plain meaning approach. See 
generally United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 990 (5th Cir. 1977) (acknowledging a conflict 
over the nexus requirement and describing the language of § 1962(c) as "less than pellucid"), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979); Tarlow, supra note 10, at 222-34 (discussing conflicting views 
on the nexus requirement);Tarlow, supra note 6, at 371 (cases dealing with the nexus requirement 
"have produced a number of ambiguous and conflicting tests to describe this relationship"). See 
also Fordham & Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3 V AND. L. 
REV. 438, 440 (1950) ("A court is not compelled by what appears to be a clear, literal interpreta-
tion to forego taking into account the common law or statutory background, the social matrix, 
legislative history and the consequences of a literal interpretation .... "). 
47. Nerone involved an illegal gambling operation conducted by the owners.ofa mobile home 
park. The chief link between the enterprise and the racketeering was that the mobile home park 
was the situs of the gambling operation. The Seventh Circuit rejected the prosecution's attempt 
to argue that the mobile home park was operated through a pattern of racketeering activity. The 
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activity in either fashion. For example, if a union official uses collec-
tive bargaining talks to acquire kickbacks in exchange for union con-
cessions, she has conducted her racketeering by means of the activities 
of the union and she has also conducted the affairs of the union by 
means of a pattern of racketeering activity. This is a classic RICO 
violation, and it is ludicrous to confuse and complicate a RICO pro-
ceeding by allowing the parties to argue over a semantic distinction 
that is more imaginary than real. The decisions relying on the Nerone 
analysis seem to have found a distinction which can be used to dismiss 
an action when in reality the decisions seem justifiable only on the 
ground that the relationship really is just too attenuated in the particu-
lar case.48 Thus, the simplified and semantic "dictionary" test is inad-
equate to capture the complexities of RICO. 
government argued that the park "existed in substantial part as a vehicle for applicants' illegal 
gambling operation." The court replied that 
[t]he only fair implication of this formulation is that [the defendants] conducted the casino 
operation through the mechanism of the mobile park corporation. The Government further 
asserts that the jury could reasonably conclude that [the defendants] "used the mobile home 
park to house, promote, and conceal their illegal gambling operation." Once again, how-
ever, this statement can only be read as suggesting that the casino operation was advanced 
through the instrumentality of the corporation. 
Nerone, 563 F.2d at 851 (emphasis in original). 
48. In United States v. Gibson, 486 F. Supp. 1230 (S.D. Ohio 1980), ajfd., 615 F.2d 825 (6th 
Cir. 1982), a RICO count was dismissed against a union official who had misused union assets for 
his own personal gain. The court acknowledged that under the Scotto-Provenzano rule, see text 
at note 31 supra, the defendant would be held to have violated RICO. However, the court did 
not believe that Congress had gone so far to encompass all embezzlement under RICO: 
Admittedly, the racketeering activity at issue here is connected to the operation of the union 
in the sense that Gibson would not have been able to accomplish the embezzlement of union 
funds but for his position with the union. We must presume, however, that had Congress 
desired to use RICO to prohibit all racketeering activity in connection with or through the 
instrumentality of a legitimate enterprise, it would have done so expressly. In this connec-
tion, it is pertinent that RICO's legislative history reveals a congressional intention to eradi· 
cate the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations, and 
not, in particular, to reach all racketeering activity which has any connection with a legiti-
mate enterprise. 
486 F. Supp. at 1244. The court should have been content to stop at this point, see Part II infra, 
but went on to cite Nerone and hold that the defendant conducted the racketeering through the 
enterprise rather than vice versa. 486 F. Supp. at 1244. Throughout the opinion it is clear thut 
the court is really concerned with the fact that the funds were used for personal reasons having 
nothing to do with the union. See Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 198l)(distin-
guishing Gibson on the ground that it was a case where the enterprise was merely a setting for the 
racketeering activity). The court seems to seize on terminology to justify its decision that RICO 
should not apply. In the reverse situation, Tarlow, supra note 6, at 294, suggests that "some 
judges who are result oriented have strained to adopt broad constructions of RICO by ignoring 
logical and theoretical consistency." LaFave and Scott have described this possibility of "result· 
oriented" decision making: 
There is something of a dispute among those who like to speculate on the workings of the 
judicial mind as to whether courts first decide how a defective statute ought to be inter-
preted and then display whatever canons of statutory construction will make this interpreta· 
tion look inevitable, or whether the courts actually first use the applicable canons and 
second reach the result. Doubtless the truth lies somewhere in between - some judges are 
apt to do it one way, some the other; some cases lend themselves to one technique, some to 
the other. 
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 70 (1972) (footnote omitted). 
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4. The "Manage or Operate" Test 
In United States v. Mandel, 49 the Fourth Circuit sustained the dis-
missal of a RICO count because the defendant was not involved in 
"the operation or management of [the] enterprise."50 The act in ques-
tion was the transfer of a business interest as a bribe. The court held 
that this conduct did not amount to participation in the affairs of the 
enterprise because a passive investment interest in the enterprise can-
not satisfy the RICO "nexus" requirement.5 1 
Mandel can be criticized both for its. textual interpretation and its 
reading of RICO's legislative history. The court essentially replaces 
the statutory terms "conduct or participate" with the words "manage 
or operate." However, the words are not synonymous, and "section 
1962(c) makes no requirement that the person charged be entitled to 
any particular degree of managerial responsibility. The statute pro-
vides only that "any person employed by or associated with' the cor-
rupt enterprise shall be criminally liable."52 
Although the Mandel court purports to rely on legislative his-
tory, 53 its reasoning is incomplete. RICO and the Organized Crime 
Control Act were passed because of the difficulty of convicting organ-
ized crime leaders who placed subordinates in control of the day-to-
day affairs of an enterprise and passively reaped the profits. 54 How-
ever, important figures in organized crime who remain on the fringe of 
the racketeering will escape prosecution if the defendant must manage 
or operate the enterprise. While Mandel represents the narrowest lim-
itation of "nexus" yet adopted, 55 the "manage or operate" approach 
49. 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cen. denied. 445 U.S. 961 (1980). 
50. 591 F.2d at 1374. The defendants in Mandel were the former governor of Maryland and 
his associates. The court believed that its conclusion was mandated by the nexus requirement of 
§ 1962(c): 
[T]he word "through" in the statute . . . would seem to require proof of some connection 
between the pattern of racketeering activity and the conducting or operating of the business. 
Indeed, this connection must be shown if the word "through" is to have any meaning in the 
statute. Without the word "through'', anyone who used income from a legitimate business 
to participate in racketeering activity would be guilty of a violation of§ 1962(c). We do not 
believe Congress meant to sweep so broadly . . . . 
591 F.2d at 1375. Although the court's solution involves the redefinition of"conduct or partici-
pate,'' it is in essence an attempt to determine the scope of the nexus relationship. See note 13 
supra. 
51. 591 F.2d at 1376. 
52. Note, supra note 11, at 781 (emphasis in original). For the text of§ 1962(c) see note 7 
supra. 
53. 591 F.2d at 1375 (stressing language in the congressional statement of purpose that 
RICO proscribes "operation of any enterprise engaged in interstate co=erce through a 'pattern' 
of 'racketeering activity.'" H. REP. No. 1549, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1970 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Ad. News, 4007, 4010 (emphasis added). 
54. See PERMANENT SUBCOMMrrrEE, supra note 5, at 2 (detailing how effectively "crime 
chieftains" insulate themselves from the operations they control); McClellan, supra note l,_ at 57-
60 (describing the difficulty of convicting organized crime leaders). 
55. See Tarlow, supra note 6, at 372 (characterizing the Mandel approach as the inost strin-
gent standard). 
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must be rejected because it reopens the hole in the enforcement "net" 
that RICO was designed to fill. 
5. The ''Essential Function" Test 
Another narrow approach is the "essential function" requirement 
of United States v. Ladmer. 56 In Ladmer, the district court declined to 
subject the defendants, who had misused union funds earmarked for 
union conventions, to RICO because their acts related to activities 
that were not essential union functions. 51 The court interpreted 
RICO's provision for injunctive relief58 as evidence of congressional 
concern with only the essential operations of an enterprise.59 
Although the Ladmer approach is commendable for its attempt to 
examine the statute in its entirety in order to derive a standard, the 
test is inadequate. First, the court fails to define the scope of the "es-
sential functions" of an operation. Clearly the attendance of conven-
tions by officials is not a prime function of a labor union. But unions 
and large corporations engage in a multitude of activities and Ladmer 
provides no standard for determining which are "essential" when the 
case is less obvious. For example, if the union officials had misused 
funds intended for the salaries of union officers, the court would be 
forced to determine if paying salaries is an essential union function. 
This is obviously a central function from the perspective of the indi-
viduals who receive this income, but the answer here is not apparent in 
the absence of a more concrete definition. 
Second, and more importantly, just as Mandel allowed fringe but 
significant parties to escape RICO, Ladmer places activity which in-
volves fringe but potentially important functions of an enterprise 
outside of RIC0.60 It would be anomalous to allow racketeers who 
bankrupt a union by misusing convention funds, an extreme variation 
of Ladmer's facts, to escape RICO sanctions. Nowhere in the legisla-
tive history is there support for the view that Congress was concerned 
with anything less than the infiltration of enterprises in its broadest 
sense. There are no qualifiers in the language of the statute or the 
56 .. 429 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). 
57. 429 F. Supp. at 1244. 
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982). 
59. The available remedies suggest that the statute is concerned with that which character-
izes the conduct of the enterprise in question in its essential functions rather than irregulari-
ties committed in the course of otherwise lawful conduct of an enterprise. There is no 
question that Congress intended to provide a remedy adequate to the evil visualized and in 
that sense to enact broadly and inclusively. 
429 F. Supp. at 1244. 
60. An example of a case that would be difficult to reconcile under the Ladmer approach is 
presented by United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), where the defendants 
operated a theater legally but engaged in a number of fraudulent acts surrounding the enter-
prise's Chapter XI bankruptcy. The district court held that nothing in RICO requires the activ-
ity to be part of the "day-to-day" business operations of an enterprise. 461 F. Supp. at 786. 
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legislative history to limit the scope of RICO to the infiltration of an 
enterprise's essential functions. 61 
While none of the judicial definitions discussed necessarily led to a 
"wrong" decision in the cases in which they were adopted, their over-
or underinclusiveness threatens unacceptable and unintended results 
unless courts modify or discard the tests in response to differing fac-
tual backgrounds. Ambiguity, the central problem running through 
all these approaches, is the direct result of attempting to capture the 
nexus requirement in a definitional word or phrase. The inadequacy 
of the current judicial formulations suggests that the search for a rigid 
test is futile and that the slipperiness of the nexus concept requires a 
more flexible approach. 
II. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE "NEXUS" 
REQUIREMENT 
A standard approach to eliminating ambiguity and creating pre-
dictability is to create a black-letter rule. This might be the preferable 
approach for the nexus requirement if it were possible. However, as 
shown in Part I, the intended breadth of RIC062 makes the fashioning 
of compact, yet comprehensive, definitions unfeasible. 63 The statute 
itself is too ambiguous to guide courts faced with a nexus question, 64 
yet the attempts at definition have proved to be equally vague or too 
rigid. 
Alternatively, courts could compare the fact situation before them 
to a set of factors which usually indicate that the affairs of an enter-
prise are being conducted "through a pattern of racketeering." Fac-
tors would then provide courts with solid guidance on the issue of 
when a defendant's activities are sufficiently related to the enterprise to 
justify applying RICO, while allowing sufficient elasticity to distin-
guish fairly the variety of fact situations that arise. The use of factors 
makes the discretion currently exercised by the courts explicit, yet si-
multaneously provides principles to inform the decision. Such a· flexi-
ble approach, with the structured discretion it vests in the courts, is 
the best alternative that can be designed. 65 
61. See United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (there are no 
qualifiers in the statute on what constitutes the affairs of an enterprise). 
62. For the view that RICO must be broad to deal with the threat of organized crime, see 
McClellan, supra note 1. For a general discussion of the breadth of RICO see Atkinson, supra 
note 35, at 4-15. 
63. Indeed, McClellan, supra note 1, at 143, asserts that because of the wide variety of of-
fenses committed by organized crime, "[i]t is impossible to draw an effective statute which 
reaches most of the commercial activities of organized crime, yet does not include offenses com-
monly committed by persons outside organized crime as well." 
64. See note 21 supra for a discussion of the potential constitutional problems this discretion 
and ambiguity creates. 
65. Further support for a flexible approach comes from the nature of the statute itself. 
RICO is not a criminal statute; it does not make criminal conduct that before its enactment 
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A. The Definitional Step 
In order to determine what factors are relevant in establishing a 
sufficient "nexus," we should examine the concerns that prompted 
Congress to enact RICO. The meaning of "conducting or participat-
ing" in the affairs of an enterprise "through" a pattern of racketeering 
cannot adequately be found in the broad language of section 1962(c). 
A narrower definition does exist, however, in light of the "statutory 
background, the social matrix, legislative history and the consequences 
of a literal interpretation."66 
Unquestionably Congress was concerned with the special threat 
posed by organizational crime.67 Organizational crime, of which or-
was not already prohibited, since its application depends on the existence of "racketeering 
activity" that violates an independent criminal statute. In addition, its standards of unlaw-
ful, le., criminal or civil, conduct are sanctioned by both criminal and civil remedies. 
RICO, in short, is a "remedial" statute. 
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 16, at 1021 n.71 (citations omitted). If RICO is indeed a "civil 
remedies" statute, then the need for black-letter rules is lessened; remedies have traditionally 
been subject to judicial discretion. See NATIONAL AssOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, 
CoMMITIBE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE USE OF CIVIL REMEDIES IN OR· 
GANIZED CRIME CoNTROL 6-7 (1977) (discussing the advantages of the greater flexibility of civil 
remedies). 
By allowing for flexibility, the approach presented in this Note is subject to claims of vague-
ness similar to those made against the current judicial forumlae. The crucial difference, however, 
is that the approach advocated here attempts to make the judicial discretion inherent in the 
provision explicit and principled. It is an unfortunate fact of the RICO nexus requirement that it 
is not susceptible to black-letter definitions. The use of a flexible factor approach, while not 
capable of completely eliminating vagueness, is a preferable "second best" strategy. 
66. Fordham & Leach, supra note 46, at 440. See also United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 
U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (It is a "familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and 
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.") 
(quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). 
RICO's liberal interpretation provision, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970), is not a bar to seeking a limited approach to RICO 
since the provision provides that RICO is to be liberally construed in light of its remedial pur-
pose. The point of the approach advocated in this Note is to demonstrate that the remedial 
purpose of RICO as reflected in the nexus requirement is narrower than the literal language of 
the statute. 
67. Organizational crime can be viewed as the general criminal use of any organization. Or-
ganized crime is a specific type of organizational crime where the organization utilized exists only 
for criminal purposes. It is undisputable that the debates in Congress over Title IX of the Organ-
ized Crime Control Act were specifically concerned with the infiltration of legitimate businesses 
by organized crime, specifically La Cosa Nostra and the effect this was having on society and the 
economy. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 59. See generally Statement of Findings and Purpose, 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-923 (1970): 
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisti-
cated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from 
America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; 
(2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such 
illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, 
the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of 
social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt 
legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; 
(4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's eco-
nomic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free 
competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic secur-
ity, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized 
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ganized crime is but a subset, can be viewed as any utilization of a 
crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law 
inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal 
and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organ-
ized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnec-
essarily limited in scope and impact. 
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United 
States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new 
penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the 
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime. 
The legislative history of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act (RICO) is not terribly 
helpful. Most of it, like the Statement of Purpose, reflects a general congressional concern with 
the growing power of organized crime. See notes 1-4 supra and accompanying text. See also 
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1984) (referring to the "clanging 
silence of the legislative history" in discussing private civil remedies), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 
901 (1985). 
RICO was not, however, written in the narrow terms of the congressional debate and some 
weight must be given to the decision to draft the statute in general terms. Congress had to avoid 
phrasing the statute in terms of organized crime and La Cosa Nostra. First, the use of such 
terms would have subjected the statute to attack as unconstitutionally vague because the defini-
tion of organized crime would be so elusive. See Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. 
Supp. 20, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
Second, the burden of proving the existence of an organized criminal structure was one of the 
problems that RICO was designed to eliminate. Including the term "organized crime" in the 
statute would have further invited courts to require a link with organized crime, resulting in 
another loophole for crime bosses to slip through. 
Despite this policy and overwhelming contrary precedent, a few district courts have dis-
missed civil cases on the ground that no tie to organized crime was alleged. See Noonan v. 
Granville Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (nothing in case involves infiltration by 
organized crime); Adair v. Hunt Intl. Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1981) 
(must be involved with " 'organized crime' or activities within the penumbra of that phrase"); 
Barr v. WUl/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (must be a member of "a society of 
criminals operating outside of the law"). Most circuit (as well as district) court cases have re-
jected this view. See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 104 S. 
Ct. 509 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982), affd. in part, reversed in 
part on rehearing en bane, 710 F.2d 1361, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); United States v. 
Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. 
Gibson, 486 F. Supp. 1230, 1240-41 (S.D. Ohio 1980), affd., 675 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The practice of requiring a link 
with organized crime has only arisen in civil cases despite the fact that the substantive offenses 
outlined in § 1962 are the same for both criminal and civil RICO. Theoretically, the same stan-
dards should apply in either type of suit. See Tarlow, supra note 6, at 302 & n.35. Furthermore, 
the organized crime requirement can find no authority within the language of statute, Barr, 66 
F.R.D. at 112-13, or in the legislative history. 
The curious objection has been raised to S.30 as a whole, and to several of its provisions in 
particular, that they are not somehow limited to organized crime - as if organized crime 
were a precise and operative legal concept, like murder, rape, or robbery. Actually, of 
course, it is a functional or sociological concept like white collar or street crime, serving 
simply as a shorthand method of referring to a large and varying group of individual crimi-
nal offenses committed in diverse circumstances. 
116 CONG. REC. 35,344 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poll). 
Although the terms "organized crime" or "organized criminal activity" were not used, RICO 
is designed specifically to combat organized crime. The definition of racketeering activity in 
§ 1961 and the substantive provision of§ 1962 sufficiently encompassed the ''symptoms" of or-
ganized crime's activities to avoid a severe overinclusivity problem. 
It is self-defeating to attempt to exclude from any list of offenses such as that found in title 
IX all offenses which commonly are committed by persons not involved in organized crime. 
Title IX's list does all that can be expected . . . it lists offenses committed by organized 
crime with substantial frequency, as part of its commercial operations. 
McClellan, supra note 1, at 144; Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30 
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bureaucratic or corporate-like structure. It is this exploitation of an 
infrastructure that increases the threat a racketeer poses to society. 
Therefore, the required linkage between the racketeering and the en-
terprise should be viewed as a requirement that the defendant utilize 
the organizational structure provided by the enterprise. 68 
There are a number of reasons for this special concern with the 
utilization of an enterprise or organizational structure to further crimi-
nal goals. Legal or illegal behavior is always more effective when car-
Before the Subcom. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 405 (1969) (letters by the Department of Justice suggesting improvements in 
§ 1961(1)(A) that would still keep the provision "broad enough to include most state statutes 
customarily invoked against organized crime."). 
The definition of what constitutes racketeering activity is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) 
(1976) which provides: 
(1) "[R]acketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, 
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous 
drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more thart 
one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, 
United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), 
sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from 
interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating 
to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate 
credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), 
section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 
(relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investi-
gations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 
1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating 
to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering parapherna-
lia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the 
prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate 
transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband 
cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable 
under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and 
loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), 
or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of 
securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, sell-
ing, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of 
the United States. 
Thus, while RICO's scope extends beyond organized crime, this does not imply that the 
statute is completely divorced from any limitations arising from its roots or the organized crime 
concept. The language of§ 1962(c) and the legislative history should be read together to estab-
lish a general concern with organizational crime, a concept encompassing all the dangers associ-
ated with organized crime, see notes 69-77 infra and accompanying text, while flexible enough to 
eliminate the problems of proof associated with the limiting of the statute's application to crimi-
nal syndicates. 
68. Requiring a showing that the defendant utilized the enterprise in his racketeering activi-
ties is from one point of view a reversal of the language of§ 1962(c), which states that it is 
unlawful "to conduct or participate . . • in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a 
pattern ofracketeering activity." See United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 851 (7th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978). While the criticism may be semantically valid, it lacks true 
substance. It is possible to describe any fact situation using either semantic formulation. Phras-
ing the nexus requirement in terms of "utilizing the orga..11izational structure" has no effect on the 
breadth of RICO. See notes 44-48 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, the test herein 
proposed provides an accurate description of the remedial purpose of§ 1962(c), whereas blind 
adherence to the words of the statute would frustrate that purpose. See notes 69-82 infra and 
accompanying text. 
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ried out by a group of persons, 69 but a qualitative leap in power and 
efficiency occurs when a group has the benefit of bureaucratic struc-
ture or infrastructure. 7° Certain advantages, such as the ability of the 
entity to outlive any of its individual members, 71 the replacement of 
informal personal relations with structured status ties,72 and the effi-
ciency of centralized impersonal decision making acquired by separa-
tion offunctions73 accrue to varying degrees when a group develops or 
co-opts a structure. 74 
Furthermore, while the individual racketeer attempting to further 
her goals through the utilization of the enterprise's organization may 
not benefit directly from the advantages of bureaucratization, she does 
benefit indirectly. Position within an enterprise resulting from 
bureaucratization provides one with a status that conveys more power 
than inherently resides with the individual. 75 The president of a union 
69. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
("[T]o unite, back of a criminal purpose, the strength, opportunities and resources of many is 
obviously more dangerous and more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer."). 
See also Brickey, supra note 16, at 442-44 (1983). 
70. Wheeler & Rothman, The Organization as Weapon In White-Collar Crime, 80 MICH. L. 
REV. 1403 (1982), use statistical and sociological data to prove that the organization is to the 
white-collar criminal what the gun is to the street - "a tool to obtain money from victims." Id. 
at 1406. Their data shows a significant increase in the gravity of certain typical white-collar 
crimes when the defendant utilized a formal organization. See note 99 infra. See generally K. 
BOULDING, THE ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTION: A STUDY IN THE ETHICS OF EcONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION (1953). There are two important ways for a criminal to obtain an organization. 
First a criminal syndicate may develop from within as La Cosa Nostra grew out of the "centuries 
old Sicilian terrorist society, the Mafia." See PERMANENT SuscoMMlTIEE, supra note 5, at 117. 
Second, a criminal organization, a single racketeer or a group of racketeers may co-opt an ex-
isting legitimate enterprise. RICO was in theory designed to deal with the second of these pos-
sibilities. See Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970). 
The decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), brought 
the first type of organization within RICO's scope. Turkette extended RICO coverage to illegiti-
mate as well as legitimate enterprises on the theory that if Congress had intended to limit the 
definition of enterprise to legitimate organizations it could have inserted the term legitimate in 
§ 1961(4). 452 U.S. at 580-81. The Turkette decision makes sense in light of the general con-
gressional concern with organized crime. It would seem nonsensical to allow an underworld 
figure to escape the punishment of RICO by claiming that he was conducting only the affairs of 
the mob. Turkette left open the issue of whether the enterprise must have an ascertainable struc-
ture apart from the racketeering activity. See note 16 supra. 
71. The Committee on the Judiciary has found that unlike the criminal gangs of the past, 
organized crime now functions regardless of individual personnel changes, like a sophisticated 
corporation. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1969). 
72. See K. BOULDING, supra note 70, at 26 (discussing how organizations grow by replacing 
"informal" communication which characterizes the family with more structured ties). 
73. See K. BOULDING, supra note 70, at 34. Boulding also discusses "the power of organiza-
tion to release new sources of energy" and to increase the productivity of time and energy de-
voted to organizations. Id. at 32. 
74. Not all possible RICO enterprises fall under the classic corporate-bureaucratic model 
discussed in K. BOULDING, supra note 70. However, it is reasonable to assume that most enter-
prises do possess some of these unique advantages that distinguish them from a person acting on 
his own behalf for legitimate or illegitimate goals. Even the Mom and Pop grocery store can be 
more efficient than the pushcart peddler. 
75. See K. BOULDING, supra note 70, at 18-20 (commenting on the need for "sta.tus" and 
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is powerful because she is president, not because she, as an individual, 
merits that degree of respect. In addition to status, an organization 
can provide the individual with a complex structure that prevents de-
tection of criminal activity,76 facilities to be exploited for criminal pur-
poses and a potential pool of witting or unwitting compatriots in the 
form of people who have adopted the organization's value system.77 
The racketeer or group of racketeers who create or utilize an enter-
prise acquire an organizational power that separates their criminality 
from the ordinary, thus necessitating special statutory treatment 
through RICO. 
Congressional concern for racketeer utilization of organizational 
structure, and thus organizational power, can be gleaned from the 
content of RICO itself. First, section 1962(c) subjects racketeering ac-
tivities to the severe sanctions of RICO only if affiliated in some man-
ner with an enterprise.78 Second, RICO's remedies emphasize 
separating the criminal element from the enterprise's structure. The 
injunctions provided for in section 196479 allow the court, in the pro-
cess of punishing the defendant, to dissolve the organization that the 
defendant utilized or to prevent the defendant from gaining access to a 
similar organization. Likewise, the forfeiture provision of section 
1963, 80 which provides for the total removal of the racketeer's influ-
how the organization provides this and can improve it). See also id. at xxxiii (discussing the 
organization's necessity for hierarchy resulting in a "highly stratified society of status"). 
76. See note S supra (discussing the difficulty of detection with the highly sophisticated struc-
ture of organized crime). 
77. K. BOULDING, supra note 70, at 8-10 (discussing how an individual's value system is 
molded by an organization); w. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956) (discussing how 
American society indoctrinates its people to assume their place in an organizational world). Part 
of the obedience of subordinates comes from what Boulding refers to as the "two-sidedness of 
organizations." 
Many of the dilemmas are created by the fact that organization is on the one hand an 
expression of solidarity within the organized group, and on the other an expression of a Jack 
of solidarity with those outside the organization. Organization, in other words, may tend to 
accentuate the division between an "in-group" and an "out-group." Almost every organiza-
tion, therefore, exhibits two faces - a smiling face which it turns towards its members and a 
frowning face which it turns to the world outside. 
K. BOULDING, supra note 70, at 10. The loyalty to and sense of belonging derived from an 
organization can be exploited by the racketeer to get subordinates to go along with activity to 
which they may be morally opposed. Id. at 10-12. 
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). 
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1982), provides: 
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain 
violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not 
limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any 
enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any 
person, including, but not ljmited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type 
of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign 
commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provi-
sion for the rights of innocent persons. 
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1982), provides: 
(c) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall authorize the Attorney 
General to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited under this section upon such 
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ence from the enterprise, acknowledges that organized crime is capa-
ble of outliving the incarceration of its individual members.81 
The extent to which the defendant utilizes the organizational struc-
ture or infra-structure of the alleged enterprise to further the racketeer-
ing activity is what the nexus requirement involves. Utilization 
requires that the enterprise be more than a context for criminal activ-
ity. To be "utilized" the enterprise must be a "weapon" of the racket-
eer;82 it must enhance the ability to commit the crime. This standard 
is the first step in developing a "flexible" approach. 
B. The "Characteristics" of Utilization of an Enterprise. 
The standard for establishing a nexus set out above - utilization 
of organizational structure - is an ambiguous definitional test which 
cannot be successfully applied without encountering problems similar 
to those that plague current judicial approaches. The approach advo-
cated here is the same as that used by Congress in the face of the vague 
concept of organized crime: the best way to identify the utilization of 
the enterprise is to look for its symptoms. 83 The characteristics of ex-
ploitation of an organizational structure to which a court should look 
can be derived from the advantages which an infrastructure offers the 
criminal, the elements of organized crime that troubled Congress and 
the policy considerations which underlie RICO. No single character-
istic is necessarily sufficient to sustain a determination of a substantial 
nexus. The importance of any factor will vary depending on the facts 
of a given case. The factfinder must examine the factors as evidence of 
utilization of organizational structure in order to determine whether 
the organization was used "as a weapon" by the racketeer. 
First, the court should inquire whether the type of criminal activ-
ity in question requires or is generally associated with an enterprise. 
When an enterprise is a prerequisite for the commission of the crime 
the inquiry is simplified. For example, the bankruptcy scheme of 
United States v. DePalma84 could not occur without the enterprise. In 
terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper. If a property right or other interest is 
not exercisable or transferable for value by the United States, it shall expire, and shall not 
revert to the convicted person. All provisions oflaw relating to the disposition of property, 
or the proceeds from the sale thereof, or the remission or mitigation of forfeitures for viola-
tion of the customs Jaws, and the compromise of claims and the award of compensation to 
informers in respect of such forfeitures shall apply to forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have 
been incurred, under the provisions of this section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent 
with the provisions hereof. Such duties as are imposed upon the collector of customs or any 
other person with respect to the disposition of property under the customs Jaws shall be 
performed under this chapter by the Attorney General. The United States shall dispose of 
all such property as soon as commercially feasible, making due provision for the rights of 
innocent persons. 
81. See note 71 supra. 
82. See generally Wheeler & Rothman, supra note 70. 
83. See note 67 supra. 
84. 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In DePalma the defendants successfully denied inves-
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contrast, many fact situations involve crimes that are not inherently 
enterprise crimes, such as murder or arson. 85 If the crimes involved 
are "enterprise" crimes, arguably the inquiry need proceed no further 
since the nexus is established within the definition of the criminal 
activity. 86 
Second, a court should consider the defendant's position in the en-
terprise and the extent to which it furthered the racketeering activity. 
Of particular relevance here are access to organizational structure and 
power and the use of status to further criminal purposes. The higher 
the position within the organization, the more likely it is that the de-
fendant had at her disposal the appurtenances of organizational struc-
ture, including the possibility of access to the enterprise's financial 
resources and/ or books, 87 access to inside information, or a degree of 
control over facilities and subordinates. 88 The factfinder can examine 
position within the enterprise to determine whether the defendant had 
the ability to channel the organizational power of the enterprise to 
illegitimate ends. In addition, position can provide status or recogni-
tional power which can be used for criminal purpose. 89 This situation 
arises frequently in cases involving bribery of police officers or union 
offi.cials;90 the defendant uses the power the organizational structure 
confers in the form of status. The factfinder should also determine 
whether the defendant relied on her organizational status to commit 
the crimes; position itself is not necessarily determinative.91 A high-
tors their share of the assets of a corporation in Chapter XI bankruptcy by "skimming" assets 
from the corporation and successfully hiding them in anticipation of bankruptcy. 461 F. Supp. at 
797-98. 
85. Murder and arson are made predicate acts in 18 U.S.C. § 196l(l)(A) (1982). 
86. There may still be policy reasons for not considering the nexus established solely by 
"enterprise" crimes. For example, this Note argues that one of the factors that should be consid-
ered is the magnitude of the criminal acts. See notes 99-103 infra and accompanying text. 
87. See, e.g., United Sates v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (In order to skim 
off assets to prevent creditors from claiming them in Chapter XI bankruptcy proceedings, the 
defendants utilized their power as directors of the corporation to alter the books and move 
assets.). 
88. See note 77 supra. 
89. See note 75 supra and accompanying text. 
90. See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.) (union official soliciting 
bribes so truckers could violate Teamster's "city man" rule), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982); 
United States v. Sanzo, 673 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.) (union official accepting kickback so nonunion 
labor could be employed), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982); United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 
531 (5th Cir.) (Louisiana Commissioner of Agriculture soliciting and accepting bribes), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982); United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778 (4th Cir. 1982) (head of West 
Virginia Alcohol Beverage Control Commission accepting bribes), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829 
(1982); United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1981) (sheriff receiving bribes to protect 
gambling), cert denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). 
91. This factor is related to the approach embodied in the Scotto-Provenzano formulation, see 
notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text, but differs in the important sense that the defendant's 
position is a consideration rather than a rigid test. There are cases where the importance of the 
use of organization status alone calls for the finding of a nexus. In this type of case the Scotto-
Provenzano rule yields the same result as the flexible approach. However, in a less obvious case 
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ranking position provides the racketeer with advantages. While this 
factor indicates what those advantages are,92 the factfinder must deter-
mine if they were in fact utilized. 
Third, the court should determine the extent to which the enter-
prise served to complicate detection. Even if an enterprise was not 
used to facilitate the criminal activity, the organizational structure can 
make a major contribution to the racketeering effort by providing a 
"cover." Bureaucracy makes law enforcement more difficult; it al-
lows the separation of decision making from implementation, making 
it much harder to find and convict the leaders of organized crime.93 
When a legitimate enterprise is involved, detection is complicated by 
the ability to use the enterprise as a cover for racketeering activity and 
to "launder" funds through the enterprise.94 Finally, the sheer com-
plexity of the entity that can be achieved through a corporate structure 
makes detection difficult. This is the case with La Casa Nostra where 
determining and then proving who was involved in wliat activity has 
proved most intractable. 95 
The extent to which the enterprise provided a front or served to 
complicate detection is relevant on policy as well as on practical 
grounds. RICO was passed in part to bolster the existing criminal law 
in obtaining convictions where detection was difficult.96 This factor is 
designed to help effectuate the congressional concern with the use of 
the enterprise to mask racketeering. 
Fourth, the use of physical facilities of the enterprise is an obvious 
indication of the utilization of the enterprise. However, the use of en-
terprise facilities is the least reliable symptom of the existence of the 
where the defendant did not rely on his organizational status power as the only mechanism for 
committing the racketeering, the ambiguity and rigidity of the Scotto-Provenzano test make it an 
inferior approach. 
92. In using someone's position in the enterprise as an indicator of their ability to utilize the 
organizational structure the nature of the racketeering is important. A financial crime such as 
securities fraud would require a high level management position. In contrast, while a foreman 
with authority over employees could be guilty of using organizational structure to run numbers, 
her position as a foreman only makes it more likely that she utilized the enterprise. She could in 
fact be utilizing personal or mob ties to get cooperation of the employees. Other factors would 
have to be considered to determine if she relied in fact on her organizational status. 
93. See PERMANENT SUBCOMMITrEE, supra note 5 (discussing the ability of "crime chief-
tains" to insulate themselves from actual implementation). 
94. Wheeler and Rothman found that "organizational" offenders are able to break the law 
more often and for longer durations than individual offenders. See Wheeler & Rothman, supra 
note 70, at 1410-11. 
This is quite consistent with other findings in our general research program which empha-
size the ability to "hide" an offense within the interstices of organization and through elusive 
manipulation of paper, making it easier for relatively sophisticated crimes to continue unde-
tected for a longer period and to occur with greater frequency. 
Id. at 1412-13. 
95. See PERMANENT SUBCOMMITIEE, supra note 5. 
96. See Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 Pub. L. 
No. 91-462, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970). See also McClellan, supra note 1, at 59-60 (discussing how 
RICO was intended to fill the gaps in the present law enforcement net). 
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nexus. Use of facilities does not necessarily mean that the existence of 
the enterprise in some way enhanced the criminal activity, but exten-
sive use of the facilities can be evidence that the enterprise was merely 
a front for illegal activity.97 Even if the enterprise is not a front, the 
use of enterprise facilities could be so vital to the criminal acts that a 
nexus is established. In this situation the nature of the facilities is as 
important as the degree of use; to the extent the enterprise provides 
facilities which are not commonly obtainable, it substantially enhances 
the racketeering. 98 
Finally, the scope and gravity of the offenses should be considered 
by the court. Professors Wheeler and Rothman have studied the ef-
fects of utilizing an organization on white-collar crime. Their results 
reveal that the crimes of "organizational offenders" are of a signifi-
cantly longer duration, involve a larger geographic scope, are more 
sophisticated, and net a great deal more money than those of "individ-
ual offenders."99 While statistical studies are not necessarily the best 
97. Compare United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978), ojfd., 625 F.2d 782 
(8th Cir. 1980), with United States v. Webster, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1982), modifying on rehear· 
ing, 639 F.2d 174 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1982). In Dennis a General Motors em· 
ployee collected unlawful debts on General Motors property. The court held that although the 
defendant was an employee and utilized the premises of the corporation to carry out his scheme, 
this was not enough to establish a nexus between the enterprise and the defendant's racketeering 
activity. In Webster the Fourth Circuit focused on the extensive use of a nightclub's facilities by 
a narcotics ring in determining that there was a sufficient nexus between the nightclub and the 
racketeering. 
Evidence introduced at the trial tended to show that, by means of the telephone company's 
call-forwarding service, telephone calls to Webster's and Thompson's home telephone 
(which was tapped by court order) were frequently forwarded to the telephone at the 1508 
Club; that Club facilities and personnel were used to accept and relay narcotics related 
messages; and that, on at least one occasion, a Club employee was asked by Webster to 
provide Club-owned drinks to one of Webster's narcotics customers who was waiting for 
drugs to be brought so that a transaction could take place. The evidence which the govern· 
ment has offered as sustaining the convictions under subsection (c) indicates that the facili-
ties of the 1508 Club were regularly made available to, and put in the service of, the 
defendants' drug dealing business. 
669 F.2d at 187 (citation omitted) (quoting Webster, 639 F.2d at 183, 184). 
98. When the enterprise merely provides facilities such as cars, telephones, a place to make 
deliveries or any other easily obtainable item, the enterprise has not enhanced the threat posed by 
the racketeers, but has simply provided a convenient source of "supplies." Extensive use of 
ordinary facilities can be evidence that the enterprise was a front. See note 97 supra. To estab-
lish a nexus, when the enterprise is not a front, the facilities of the enterprise utilized should 
provide the racketeer with power he would not have if acting completely outside the enterprise. 
For instance, some enterprises can provide facilities that are unique. See, e.g .. United States v. 
Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983) (defendants made extensive use of enterprise's boats, 
plane, cattle ranch and bank account to further a drug smuggling operation), cert. denied, 104 S. 
Ct. 996 (1984). 
99. See Wheeler & Rothman, supra note 70, at 1410-19. For example, the amount netted by 
"individual offenders" for the crimes studied had a median of $7,623 and a mean of $74,585. For 
"occupational offenders" the median was $8,018 and the mean $135,011. For "organizational 
offenders" the median was $387,274 and the mean was $1,077,432. Id. at 144. Wheeler and 
Rothman also discuss the possibility of using the characteristics of organizational crime as warn-
ing signs for this type of crime. Id. at 1425-26. 
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basis for a judicial rule, there are strong policy reasons for considering 
the scope of the crime as an indicator of a nexus. · 
The statistics suggest that the unusually large magnitude of a par-
ticular crime may indicate utilization of an organizational structure. 
For example, the small embezzler who pilfers petty cash does not util-
ize the organization to the same extent as the large-scale embezzler.100 
Congress drafted RICO to get at large-scale cases; it was not intended 
to get at "Mom and Pop" criminal acts. 101 Although it is not binding 
legal precedent, the Justice Department's promise not to "power rape 
nickel and dime cases"102 should be used as a guide to the intended 
scope of RICO. Use of a magnitude factor would incorporate that 
intent into the law itself, instead of leaving it to the promises of prose-
cutors.103 The judiciary should keep the crimes allowed to fall under 
RICO in line with the punishments provided by the statute. One way 
to effectuate this policy is to treat magnitude of the crime as an indica-
tor of utilization of an organization. It is important to note that sever-
ity of the crime should not be determinative of a RICO violation, but 
only used as one factor to establish a nexus. Likewise, if all other char-
acteristics point to actual utilization of the organizational structure, 
scope of the crime should not eclipse the evidence of a nexus. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued against the conventional approaches to 
RICO's "nexus requirement" because of their ambiguity and their un-
warranted attempts to limit the statutory language with rigid defini-
tions. The "nexus requirement" should be viewed as the final 
determination of whether section 1962(c) applies. Given the existence 
of an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity, the issue be-
comes whether the two elements are sufficiently related to warrant a 
conviction. The best approach to making this determination is a flexi-
ble one focusing on the extent to which the parties utilized the organi-
zational or bureaucratic structure of the enterprise. Flexibility is 
100. Embezzlement is an "enterprise" crime, so by definition there can be no question of a 
racketeering-enterprise nexus. However, there are different degrees of embezzlement based on 
their gravity; the greater the amount embezzled, or, more generally, the greater the magnitude of 
the crime, the more extensive the use of the organizational structure must be. 
101. See McClellan, supra note 1, at 141-45 (answering American Civil Liberties Union ob-
jection to RICO's potential breadth by arguing that the definition of racketeering in § 1961(1) 
and the concept of a pattern limits RICO's application to the large-scale crimes characteristic of 
La Cosa Nostra); cf. United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 659 (8th Cir.) ("We are satisfied that 
RICO was not designed to serve as a recidivist statute, imposing heavier sentences for crimes 
which are already punishable under other statutes. The Act was not intended to be a catchall 
reaching all concerted action of two or more criminals involving two or more of the designated 
crimes."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982). 
102. Atkinson, supra note 35, at 16 (quoting John Dowd, chief of the Justice Department 
task force in charge of RICO cases in 1977). The Courts have also cautioned prosecutors against 
aggressive use of RICO. See note 12 supra. 
103. See Tarlow, supra note 10, at 176-77. 
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maintained by concentrating on certain indicators of the defendant's 
use of the enterprise rather than on rigid definitions. This approach 
allows for principled judicial discretion that emphasizes the remedial 
purposes of the statute, and this can provide a meaningful limitation 
on RICO. 
